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December 13, 1963
Nath.an Siegal, Eaq.
Department of Justice
Room 5142
9th and Pennaylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr. Siegal:
Thank you for your kind letter of November 19
and your comments on my approach to the solution of the
problem of pr·esidential inability. Permit me to argue
my case a little more.
With reference to th.e "stalemate" case, under
my approach there could really be no "stalemate" since
the Preaident'a deciaion aa to his ability to re-assume
the powers and duties of hia office would be final. The
principal reason for my support of a so-called PresidentVice Preaident solution is that no individual or body
( other than Congress through impeachment) shou.ld be able
to deprive the President o:f either his office or the powers
and duties thereof. Thia waa the intention of our Fou.nding
Fathers when they wrote our great Constitution.
A Preaident-Vice Preaident approach doea, of course,
asaume a responsible Preaident bu.t impeachment liea as the
remedy for an irresponsible President. It is not my vie.w
th.at a President can or should be impeached for inability
but rather that he should be impeached for· neglect of duties
and irresponsible behavior. The possibility of impeachment for
this kind of "misdemeano ;~ " (and it must be noted that James
Madison, who waa responsible for the language used in the
impeachment provision, favored a broad interpretation of it
(reference is made to footnote 285 of my article)) would encourage a President to make a determination of his own inability or accept a determination made by the Vice President.
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It would likewiae discourage a di.tabled President from
determining a ceaaation of in.ability before he is really
ready to re-aaaume his duties. It ia submitted that a
Preaident-Viee President approach would encourage the
President to act responsibly. aa he alwaya would have
tb.e power to say when he was ablti. Moreover. it would
deter abuses by the Vice President aince if he were wrong,
the President would deny inability and that would be final
unleaa, of courae, the President waa irreaponaible, in
which case it 11tould be the responsibility of Congreaa to
act to prevent the Preeident from abusing hi• off ice. Thia
final racourae would not, of cou.rae, be taken except in
extreme caaea, wb.icb. ia as it should be.
A solution which would take the determination of
inability outaide the Executive Branch poaea a. problem,
either of interference with the Executive by other branch••
of government or of the poaaibility of a body of non-elected
official• removing one of the two off icera elected by the
wh.ole nation, or of political manipu.lation of the Presidency
by Congresa or bodies or individuals other than Congreae.
It is tru.e. tnat the giving to Congress of a broad
power to eatablish a method for determining the commencement
and termination of inability haa a good deal of flexibility
since. Co.ngreaa can legislate and re-legislate. subject to
preaidential veto, a.a the circumstances may require.. It is
alao true th.at a Constitution normally ahould contain general
principles. However, I would aay to all this that our Founding
Father• never would have aanctioned a broad inability power· in
the handa of Congreaa. They were careful to provide only one
way for a Preaide.nt to be deprived of the prerogatives of his
office, i.e., impeachment, and were quite s~cific &bout how
this wouI<rwork. Since a determination of-iriabil.~ty would !ieprive the Pntaident of his prerogative• -- at least temporarily,
i f not practically speaking, permanently - the method of
dete;,;J.ning the same ahould be no leaa specific and ahou.ld be
written into the Constitution itaelf. The fact th.at a President
can veto any solution proposed by Congress may leaaen, but it
certainly doea not eliminate. the separation of powers objection.
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Qllite frankly and quite obviollsly, I am opposed to any
•olution which would dive.rt the inability determination
outside of the Executive Branch. I believe that the
inability problem would be solved for all practical purpoaee
if the procedure• embraced in the agreement established by
President Eisenhm1er were written into the Constitution.
Such an agreement would carry with it all the necessary
safeguard•• namely:
1. No individual or body except Congresa by
impeachment, could deprive the Prea!dent of either hla
office or hia powera and duties without hi• consent.
2. Should an immediate decision be required
during an inability, the Viee President would be authorized
to act in place of the President.
3. An ambitiou• Vice President could not uau.r p
the office of the Presidency because the President's deciaion
would be final, unless Congress ahould deem it irreaponsible
and impeach llim_ And, the Vice President would only act as
President.
4. No new powar over the Executive not inherent
in the. original Constitution ia given to any individus.l, body
or Branch of Government.

In any event, I do hope that Congress will act
to solve this important problem.

Thank you for allowing me to reiterate my views.
With every good wish,
Sincerely,

John D. Feerick
JDF:•g

Off ice

